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THOMAS R. KING #1823
DWIGHT L. KING & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: (801) 486-8701

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LANIER BRUGH, INC., AND/OR
WORKERS1 COMPENSATION FUND
OF UTAH,
Defendants/Appellants,

Court of Appeals
#870418CA
Industrial Commission
#87000198

vs.
BERNICE STEWARD, Widow of
DALE STEWARD, Deceased, and
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Argument Priority #6

Applicant/Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to
Section 78-2a-3(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
in that this case involves an appeal from an order of the Industrial
Commission of Utah.
Applicant Bernice Steward filed a claim for dependent's
benefits and

burial benefits on February 19, 1986 seeking

benefits as a result of the death of her husband, Dale Steward,
who died during the course of his employment with Lanier Brugh,
Inc. on or about November 11, 1985.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Applicant Bernice Steward accepts in general the Statement
of Issues presented by Appellants.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

Section 35-1-45/ Utah Code Annotated 1953/ as amended.
Compensation for Industrial Accidents

2.

Section 35-1-68/ Utah Code Annotated 1953/ as amended.
Injury Causing Death

3.

Section 35-1-77/ Utah Code Annotated 1953/ as amended.
Medical Panel

4.

Section 35-1-82.52, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
Hearing Before Examiner

5.

Section 35-1-82.54, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
Review of Order by Commission

6.

Section 35-1-83, Utah Code Annotated 1953/ as amended.
Review by Court of Appeals

7.

Section 35-1-88/ Utah Code Annotated 1953/ as amended.
Rules of Evidence and Procedure-Admissible Evidence

8.

Rule 201/ Utah Rules of Evidence
Judicial Notice
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the case/ course of proceedings/ and disposition
by the Industrial Commission.
Applicant Bernice Steward adopts the Statement of the

Nature of the Case of Appellants.
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B.

Statement of facts.
Applicant Bernice Steward accepts for the most part the

Statement of Facts of Appellants/ but asserts that it is incomplete
and therefore makes her own Statement of Facts as follows:
1.

The decedent Dale W. Steward/ husband of Applicant

Bernice Steward/ was employed by Lanier Brugh Corporation at
the time of his death on November 12, 1985.

Mr. Steward carried

U.S. Mail during the course of his employment with Lanier Brugh.
(R. 32, 232-233)
2.

Mr. Steward was scheduled by his employer to leave

Salt Lake City at 11:00 P.M. on November 10, 1985 to drive to
Denver, Colorado.
3.

(R. 26-27)

The truck Mr. Steward was to drive was late arriving

in Salt Lake City because of bad weather.

Mr. Steward talked

to the Lanier Brugh dispatcher several times during the night
to determine if his truck was in.

At approximately 1:00 o'clock

A.M., he was instructed by the dispatcher to check back at 3:00
o'clock A.M.

(R. 27-28)

While he had worked for Lanier Brugh,

Mr. Steward's truck had never before arrived so late.
4.

(R. 33)

Mr. Steward did not go to bed the night of November

10-11 and got no sleep because he wanted to be ready when the
truck arrived.
5.

(R. 28-29)

Mr. Steward left the house to get his truck at 5:30 A.M.

on November 11, 1985.

(R.30)

5:30 P.M. on November 11.

He arrived in Denver at approximately

(R. 48)
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The trip from Salt Lake

to Denver took approximately 12 hours when it normally took
10 hours.
6.

(R. 48-49)
Mr. Steward called Mrs. Steward from Denver at 6:20 P.M.

on November 11 and reported that the roads between Salt Lake
City and Denver had been bad and very icy.
sounded very tired.
7.

(R. 30, 49)

He

(R. 31)

Mr. Steward indicated he had to call his employer

at 11:00 o'clock P.M. on November 11 to determine if his truck
was ready for the normally scheduled return trip to Salt Lake
City.

(R. 31/ 60)

He told Mrs. Steward he did not have enough

time to sleep and was too wound up.
8.

Mr. Steward had never before had a short layover of

five to six hours in Denver.
fourteen hoars.
9.

(R. 31-32)

The usual layover was twelve to

(R. 59-60)

It is estimated that Mr. Steward left Denver for the

return trip to Salt Lake between approximately 11:00 P.M. and
11:15 P.M. on November 11.
10.

(R. 86)

The accident involving Mr. Steward occurred at approximate!

11:30 P.M. according to the police report. (R. 99)
11.

Although the police report indicated that road conditions

were dry (R. 99)/ a passerby who stopped to assist stated that
the surface of 1-25 was wet with snow starting to stick to it
(R. 102-103)

His initial report shows a time of 11:45 P.M.

(R. 102)
12.

The police photographs of the scene do not reflect

the time at which they were taken. (R. 52, 191)

The officer's

report shows arrival at the accident scene at 11:44 P.M. (R. 99)
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13.

An eyewitness to the accident observed the truck

move over two lanes to the left and hit the concrete median,
lodging on top. (R. 105)

The two witnesses found Mr. Steward

upside down in the truck cab with his arms hanging over his
head and his feet tangled. (R. 102, 104, 106-7)

Mr. Steward's

eyes were open, there was no pulse, and no CPR was administered.
(R. 106-7)

The police arrived shortly after this point.

(R. 104)
14.

The emergency record from the Humana Hospital-Mountain

View indicates Mr. Steward died at 12:08 A.M. on November 12,
1985, of acute cardiac arrest. (R. 116)
15.

Mr. Steward's body was returned to Utah by Inman

Nationwide Shipping. (R. 231)

The mortician who prepared Mr.

Steward's body for viewing at Walker Mortuary in Provo, Utah,
stated his opinion that bruises and swelling on the right side
of Mr. Steward's neck and face appeared to have resulted from
a blow or impact. (R. 253)
16.

Lanier Brugh expended approximately $9,700.00 to

repair damage to the truck driven by Mr. Steward. (R. 234-242)
Along with other damage to the vehicle, the seat was damaged
the steering wheel was bent, and the windshield was cracked.
(R. 79)
17.

On October 11, 1985, Mr. Steward was examined by

Dr. Gerald R. Moress,

who changed Mr. Steward's prescription

for Dexedrine from 10 milligrams to 15 milligrams.
of his examination, Dr. Moress
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At the time

noted blood pressure at 120/80

and no carotid bruits. (R. 133)

Treatment with Dexedrine apparen

commenced in September, 1980. (R. 129-130)

Mr. Steward was

apparently taking Dexedrine at the time of the accident.
(R. 38)
18.

Mr. Steward was 56 years old at the time of his death

and smoked \ \ packs of cigarettes per day.
approxiately 36 years. (R. 55)

He had smoked for

Dr. Maurice Taylor had treated

Mr. Steward for emphysema. (R. 125)
19.

Mr. Steward was approximately 5 feet 1\

inches tall

and weighed approximately 180 pounds. (R. 42)
20.

Mr. Steward had no prior history of cardiac disease

(R. 245) and had been told by Dr. Moress

shortly before he

died that he had the heart of a young man. (R. 42)
21.

According to Mrs. Steward/ Mr. Steward had taken

Ritalin on only one occasion/ and had taken only one of the
10 milligram Dexedrine tablets at a time. (R. 56-57)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I: The Utah Supreme Court has pointed out on a number
of occasions that an appellate court's review of Findings of
Fact made by the Industrial Commission is strictly limited and
is not based on agreement with the Commission's findings or
whether the findings are supported by a preponderance of the
evidence.

The reviewing court's sole inquiry

is,

whether the Commission's findings are 'arbitrary or
capricious/1 or 'wholly without cause' or contrary to
the 'one [inevitable] conclusion from the evidence' or
without 'any substantial evidence' to support them. Only
then should the Commission's findings be displaced.
Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Monfredi/ 631 P.2d 888, 890
(Utah 1981).
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In this matter, the Administrative Law Judge/ affirmed by the
Industrial Commission/ correctly found that Mr. Steward had
no preexisting heart condition or other preexisting conditions/
allowing Mrs. Steward to establish legal causation by showing
"any exertion connected with his employment." Allen v. Industrial
Commission/ 729 P.2d 15/ 29 (Utah 1986).
POINT II: Mrs. Steward established by uncontroverted evidence
that Mr. Steward was under unusual stress and was extremely
fatigued at the time of death.

He had had a sleepless night

on November 10-11/ had driven for 12 hours to Denver over icy
roads/ and had had a short/ 5 to 6 hour layover with apparently
no sleep before beginning his return to Salt Lake City.

Legal

causation was established even if the "unusual exertion" standard
of Allen is applied.
POINT III: Medical causation was established by evidence from
Dr. Heilbrun tuing Mr. steward's death to stress and fatigue
and by the causation factors for cardiac arrythmias referred
to by Dr. Perry and of which the Administrative Law Judge properly
took judicial notice pursuant to Rule 201/ Utah Rules of Evidence.
Section 35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated 1953/ as amended/ provides
that the Commission may refer the medical aspects of a case
to a medical panel.

The Commission's use of a medical panel

is thus permissive.

Given the facts surrounding Mr. Steward's

death/ including his lack of sleep over the prior 26 hours/
the evidence of a causal relationship between the stress and
fatigue and Mr. Steward's death was not uncertain or highly
technical.
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POINT IV: The Commission properly reviewed the entire record
in this matter as provided in Section 35-1-82.54/ Utah Code
Annotated 1953/ as amended.

Even if a transcript of the testimony

were not reviewed/ which has not been established/ the Commission
had available the summary of testimony prepared by the Administrativ
Law Judge.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE DECEDENT HAD NO PREEXISTING HEART CONDITION
OR OTHER PREEXISTING CONDITIONS AND WAS ENTITLED
TO USE THE "ANY EXERTION" STANDARD OF ALLEN
TO ESTABLISH LEGAL CAUSATION

As the Workers' Compensation Fund has pointed out/ the
Administrative Law Judge in this matter found that the decedent/
Dale Steward/ had no "previously diagnosed heart condition".
(R. 270)

This finding is not controverted in any of the evidence

before the Commission.

The Fund refers to various "risk" factors

but the fact remains that Mr. Steward had never previously been
diagnosed as having heart problems and no medical examination
before or after his death indicated the presence of preexisting
heart disease.
The Fund refers to a comment of Dr. M. Peter Heilbrun/
Mr. Steward's treating physician for a number of years for a
prior industrial-related back injury/ wherein Dr. Heilbrun stated:
"In retrospect/ it makes me wonder if some of his recent neck
and shoulder pain was possibly myocardial in origin." (R. 135)
Dr. Heilbrun's comment was made in a November 18/ 1985
letter to Dr. Gerald Moress/ another of Mr. Steward's treating
physicians/ and appears to have been simply a question.

Other

evidence from Dr. Heilbrun adequately supports the finding of
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the Administrative Law Judge.
Dr. Heilbrun

In a letter dated July 25, 1986,

explained as follows:

Mr. Dale Steward was treated by me over several years,
from the time of his industrial injury of August 1, 1975, to
his death in 1985.
I last saw Mr. Steward on July 29, 1985 at which time
he was having further neck pain which suggested evidence
of persistent degenerative osteoarthritis without evidence
of sufficient root compression. In addition, he had evidence
of left shoulder pain secondary to either bicipital tendonitis
impingement syndrome of the humeral head or a small rotator
cuff tear. He improved with local injection by Dr. Ronald
Mann.
It should be noted that, although Mr. Steward had evidence
of musculo-skeletal disease, his apparent cause of death
was a myocardial infarction while driving a truck.
He had no prior history of cardiac disease, thus his death
should be considered to be an industrial-related [sic]
cardiac event. (R. 245)
In addition to Dr. Heilbrun's statements, Dr. Moress had
performed a physical examination of Mr. Steward on October 11,
1985, at which time he noted as follows:
From a health standpoint, he has been diagnosed as having
emphysema. He continues to smoke two packs a day.
On examination blood pressure is 120/80, no carotid bruits,
normal fundiscopic, normal pharynx. (R. 133)
At prior examinations on April 24, 1981, and September 27, 1980,
Dr. Moress indicated on both occasions that Mr. Steward's blood
pressure was 120/80 and noted no signs of heart trouble or heart
disease. (R. 129, 131)
The only medical evidence presented by the Fund was a
letter from J. Joseph Perry, M.D., to Shaun Howell, attorney
for the Fund.

Dr. Perry's conclusion is as follows:

In terms of medical probability it is most likely that
[Dale Steward] experienced a fatal cardiac arrhythmia
while driving, lost consciousness a few seconds later
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thus losing control of the vehicle and having the accident
as reported. It is possible that his dextroamphetamine
was related to his death because it may worsen arrhythmias
in suseptible [sic] individuals. (R. Ill)
Dr. Perry made no other conclusion with regard to preexisting
heart disease in Mr. Steward and there was thus no substantial
medical evidence before the Administrative Law Judge to indicate
that Mr. Steward had any heart condition.
The standard of review by an appellate court of Industrial
Commission orders has been well explained in several opinions
of the Utah Supreme Court.

In Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Monfredi,

631 P.2d 288 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court, after reviewing
a number of Utah cases, stated as follows:
Under any of these standards—Kavalinakis, Kent, or N o r r i s —
it is apparent that this court's function in reviewing
Commission findings of fact is a strictly limited one
in which the question is not whether the Court agrees
with the Commission's findings or whether they are
supported by the preponderance of evidence. Instead,
the reviewing court's inquiry is whether the Commission's
findings are 'arbitrary or capricious,' or 'wholly
without cause' or contrary to the 'one [inevitable]
conclusion from the evidence' or without 'any substantial
evidence' to support them. Only then should the
Commission's findings be displaced. _Id. at 890.
It is clear in this case that there was substantial evidence
to support the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Mr. Steward
had no preexisting heart disease.
The Administrative Law Judge also found that one of the
contributing factors to his stress was "the use of amphetamines,
probably in greater amounts than usual because of the lack of
adequate rest." (R. 270)

The Judge's findings were based on

references in the record to use of amphetamines by Mr. Steward.
For example, his wife indicated during the November 5, 1986
hearing that Mr. Steward had been taking 10 milligrams of
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Dexedrine, and that the dosage had recently been increased to
15 milligrams by Dr. Moress. (R. 38-40, 57)

Mrs. Steward

testified that he usually only took the medication while he was
working:
Q

How often would he take that medication?

A

When he needed it.

But he wouldn't take it at home.

He'd only take it while

he was working, so he could stay awake. (R. 40)
•

*

*

Q

Did he have problems staying awake when he was home?

A

Yes, he did.

Q

What would he do?

A

Well, only once in a great while, if it really got

bad, well, then he'd take one and that.

But he wouldn't

take it towards the evening, he'd take it towards morning
because he'd want to spend time with us. (R. 41)
Mrs. Steward referred to Mr. Steward's sleep condition as
narcolepsy. (R. 38)

In his initial reports with regard to Mr.

Steward, Dr. Moress refers to possible narcolepsy. (R. 130, 131)
Dr. Heilbrun refers on several occasions to Dr. Moress's treatment
of Mr. Steward for narcolepsy. (R. 149, R. 255)

Dr. Perry,

however, felt that narcolepsy had not been securely diagnosed:
Complicating the issue is the mention of narcolepsy in
the medical record. The patient had a history of sudden
sleep attacks while driving and had been treated by
amphetamines by his physician for several years prior
to his demise. I find no studies in the records to
document narcolepsy, thus this diagnosis is not secure
in this individual. (R. Ill)
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The Administrative Law Judge made no finding that Mr. Steward
suffered from narcolepsy or that narcolepsy was a preexisting
medical condition.

Although the Industrial Commission refers

to narcolepsy in its Order Denying Motion for Review (R. 286)/
this reference does not amount to a finding.
Pursuant to the findings of the Administrative Law Judge,
therefore/ Mr. Steward was taking amphetamines at the time of
his accident/ but the use of amphetamines was directly related
to his employment and was necessary for him to remain awake and
alert while driving.

This use of prescribed medication does not

constitute a preexisting condition as defined in Allen v.
Industrial Commission/ 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
POINT II:

EVEN IF A PREEXISTING CONDITION IS
FOUND TO EXIST, DECEDENT STEWARD
EXPERIENCED UNUSUAL EXERTION

Pursuant to the factors set forth in Allen v. Industrial
Commission/ supra/ since Mr. Steward did not bring to his work
"a personal element of risk such as a preexisting condition"/
Id, at 25, any employment-related exertion is enough to establish
legal causation.
If th€*re is no personal causal contribution/ that is/
if there is no prior weakness or disease/ any exertion
connected with the employment and causally connected
with the [injury] as a matter of medical fact is
adequate to satisfy the legal test of causation. I<5. at
26/ citing Larson, Workman's Compensation, Sec. 38.83 (b),
at 7-278.
Even if it were determined that Mr. Steward had a preexisting
condition/ the facts in this proceeding establish that Mr. Steward
experienced "exertion greater than that undertaken in normal/
everyday life" / Allen, supra/ at 25, or "an unusual or extraordinary
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exertion."

_Id. at 26.

The Administrative Law Judge heard

undisputed testimony establishing that Mr. Steward had had little
sleep for at least 26 hours prior to his death.

Between 7:00

and 9:00 P.M. on November 10, 1985, he learned that his truck
would be delayed. (R. 27)

From at least that time until his

departure at 5:30 A.M. on November 11, he did not go to bed
and called the dispatcher for his employer on several occasions
through the night to determine if his truck had arrived. (R. 28-29)
When he called Mrs. Steward at 6:20 P.M. on November 11 from
Denver, he indicated he was very tired and that he would not be
able to sleep before leaving to return to Salt Lake at 11:00 P.M.
(R. 30-32)

According to Mrs. Steward, Mr. Steward's truck had

never been as late as it was on November 10-11 and he had never
had such a short layover in Denver. (R. 33, 59-60)
As indicated by uncontroverted testimony, Mr. Steward
experienced unusual or extraordinary stress and fatigue prior
to his death.

The evidence provides a more than adequate basis

for the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Mrs. Steward
had established legal causation, even if the higher standard
which comes into play when a preexisting condition exists is
used.
POINT III.

THE COMMISSION PROPERLY DETERMINED
THAT MEDICAL CAUSATION WAS ESTABLISHED

The court in the Allen case, supra, summarized the
claimant's responsibility as follows:
Under the medical cause test, the claimant must show
by evidence, opinion, or otherwise that the stress,
strain, or exertion required by his or her occupation
led to the resulting injury or disability. Id. at 27.
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Mrs. Steward presented evidence establishing the extreme fatigue
and stress under which her husband was functioning at the time
of his death.

It is significant that the Fund's physician/

Dr. Perry/ apparently was not presented with information about
the stress and fatigue factors/ since nowhere in his letter does
he mention Mr. Steward's schedule/

his lack of sleep/ or the

effects on him of the adverse weather conditions he experienced
while driving to Denver. (R. 110-111)
In a letter dated November 28/ 1986/ Dr. Heilbrun stated
he had reviewed the fatigue and stress factors and noted as
follows:
As I stated in my note of July 25/ 1986/ addressed 'To
Whom It May Concern'/ I believe that/ with the stress
surrounding the driving and delivery requirements of
Mr. Steward's job/ I agree with t)r. Perry there is a
reasonable medical probability that the patient suffered
a fatal arrhythmia while driving and/ thus/ his death
should be considered an industrial related [sic]
cardiac event. (R. 255)
Although the findings and order of the Administrative Law Judge
do not refer to Dr. Heilbrun's letter/ counsel for Mrs. Steward
received permission from the Judge to submit the letter (R. 92),
and it was provided to opposing counsel and the Judge and made
part of the record. (R. 254-256)
In sum, Dr. Heilbrun reviewed the stress and fatigue
factors not addressed by Dr. Perry and determined they were
contributing factors to Mr. Steward's death.

No evidence of

any nature contradicting Dr. Heilbrun's conclusion has been
presented by the Fund.
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Apart from the November 28 letter from Dr. Heilbrun, the
Administrative Law Judge took judicial notice of a chart
reproduced in the Order Denying Motion for Review of the
Industrial Commission. (R. 287-288)

As noted by the Commission,

the chart constituted "consensus medical opinion that stress/
fatigue and stimulants are all common precipitating causes of
cardiac arrhythmias."

(R. 287)

The Fund makes much of the fact

that the chart was not introduced during the hearing itself and
asserts that the Fund was entitled to be afforded an opportunity
to refute the judicially noted information.

The Administrative

Law Judge's consideration of the material/ however/ was entirely
appropriate and is supported by the Utah Rules of Evidence/
case law/ and statutes.
Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that a
court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts "capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."

(Rule 201(b)(2) )

The court may take judicial notice upon its own initiative
(Rule 201(c) ) and/ upon timely request/ a party is entitled to
be heard concerning the "propriety of taking judicial notice
and the tenor of the matter noticed.

In the absence of prior

notification/ the request may be made after judicial notice has
been taken." (Rule 201(e) )

It is significant that judicial

notice may be taken at any stage of a proceeding. (Rule 201(f) )
Although Rule 201 provides a mechanism for the Fund to be
heard with regard to the

Administrative Law Judge's taking of

judicial notice/ the Fund made no request to be heard and should
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not be allowed to complain at this stage of the proceedings that
it could not object to the material.
The Fund makes reference to a recent Colorado case, Prestige
Homes, Inc. v. Legouffe, 658 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1983), wherein the
Colorado Supreme Court held that the Colorado Court of Appeals
improperly took judicial notice of certain medical treatises in
overturning an Industrial Commission order.

The court properly

noted that judicial notice is cautiously used, Ld. at 853, but
the facts in the present situation are distinguishable from
those in the Legouffe case.

First, the Court of Appeals in

Legouffe took judicial notice of medical information to overrule
the specific fact findings of the Industrial Commission's referee.
The appellate court used certain medical treatises to discredit
the considered opinion of an expert medical witness concerning
medical effects
power line.

of contact by the decedent with a 220 volt

j^d. at 853-854.

The Supreme Court in Legouffe was

justifiably critical of the appellate court's attempt to place
itself in the position of the finder of fact.
By contrast, in the present case judicial notice was taken
by the Administrative Law Judge of a table considered by the
Commission to be "consensus medical opinion."

(R. 287)

The

material is not in conflict with any of the medical opinions
in the case and simply supplements evidence already before the
court.

Dr. Perry himself referred to certain factors which

may cause a fatal cardiac arrhythmia, including drug use (R. Ill)
and coronary artery disease. (R. 112)
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As noted previously,

Dr. Perry did not consider the stress and fatigue factors, but
they were reviewed by Dr. Heilbrun who felt Mr. Steward probably
suffered a fatal arrhythmia ij[ "the stress surrounding the
driving and delivery requirements of Mr. Steward's job" was
also considered. (R. 255-256)
The Administrative Law Judge was not attempting to
substitute his judgment for that of any of the doctors in the
matter, but rather took judicial notice of an additional factor
not referred to by Dr. Perry.

As noted by the Judge:

For the most part, the Administrative Law Judge adopts
the foregoing opinions of Dr. Perry as his own findings
of fact. However, the Administrative Law Judge finds
that Dr. Perry's opinions do not appear to be based
upon all of the facts as reflected by the record and for
this reason the Administrative Law Judge differs from
Dr. Perry with respect to the ultimate question of medical
causation. (R. 272)
The Administrative Law Judge then concluded that emotional
stress and fatigue "may well have precipitated [Mr. Steward's]
fatal cardiac arrhythmia." (R. 272)

This conclusion is supported

not only by the judicially noted chart, but by the opinion of
Dr. Heilbrun.
The Fund asserts that it would have refuted the evidence
judicially noted by the Administrative Law Judge by pointing
out that since Mr. Steward was taking prescription drugs, he
was predisposed to suffering a fatal arrhythmia. (Appellants'
Brief, p. 19)

This position was already before the Administrative

Law Judge, however, since Dr. Perry referred to the fact that
dextroamphetamine could "worsen arrhythmias in susceptible individual
(R. Ill)
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The Utah Supreme Court has approved Industrial Commission
use of judicial notice even when in direct conflict with testimony
of a physician.

In North Beck Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission

of Utah/ 58 Utah 486, 200 P. Ill (1921), the Court stated as
follows:
Commenting upon the position taken by the Commission,
counsel for plaintiffs say it is difficult to see how
they arrive at a 50 per cent, loss of his hand on this
basis, because the only evidence in the record shows that
the loss should be 'around 30 or 40 per cent.1 That was
the effect of the testimony of a physician at the hearing
before the Commission. A majority of the Commission disregard
the testimony of the physician, evidently believing that
they knew as much as he about the degree of efficiency
lost by the amputation of the fingers of a hand.
* * *

We are impressed, from what is common knowledge of which
courts take judicial notice, that the appellant's loss
of the usability of his hand in his vocation as a miner
exceeds the 50 per cent, loss of efficiency found by the
Commission, and that if the Commission made any mistake
it Wcis not in finding the per centage of loss of claimant's
right hand to be in excess of 50 per cent. IQ. at 492-494.
In the present situation, as discussed above, the Administratis
Law Judge took judicial notice of factors that had been already
discussed by Dr. Heilbrun and Dr. Perry.

The Judge did not

use the judicially noticed material to refute any medical conclusion
which dealt with all of the facts before him, but simply evaluated
facts not addressed by Dr. Perry.
In conclusion, it hardly requires noting that Section
35-1-88, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, provides:
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall
be bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of
evidence, or by any technical or formal rules of procedure.
. . . The commission may make its investigation in such
manner as in its judgment is best calculated to carry
out justly the spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The Workers' Compensation Fund cites cases which they contend
-18-

show the Administrative Law Judge's actions prejudiced them
or deprived the Fund of its Constitutional right to an impartial
hearing.

The Fund's position is without basis, however, since

the factors of stress, fatigue, and amphetamine use were presented
and addressed at the hearing and in subsequent submissions by
the parties and were considered by Drs. Heilbrun and Perry.
The Judge took no short cuts and the Fund had an opportunity
to address all factors considered by him.
Even if this court disregarded Dr. Heilbrun's opinion
and determined that the Administrative Law Judge improperly
took judicial notice of the reference material, Mrs. Steward
has provided sufficient evidence to establish medical causation.
As noted in the Allen case, a claimant can establish medical
causation in several ways, since "the stress, strain, or exertion
required by his or her occupation" and leading to injury or
death may be shown by "evidence, opinion, or otherwise. ..."
Id. at 9.
A Colorado Supreme Court decision, Industrial Commission
v. Havens, 314 P.2d 698 (1957), deals with a fact situation
similar to the present case and discusses how medical causation
may be shown.

In Havens, the court reversed a decision of the

Industrial Commission denying compensation to an individual
who was found dead in the cab of his truck ten minutes after
leaving a restaurant where he had eaten lunch.

The court noted

that no medical examination of the body was performed and there
was no autopsy.
occlusion".

The coroner listed the cause of death as "coronary

Id. at 699-700.

The decedent had been examined
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by his company's doctor several days before his death and the
doctor had noted no heart conditions or problems and stated
that Mr. Haven's blood pressure was normal. _Id. at 700.
Although neither the claimants nor the defendants presented
any medical evidence linking the decedent's work activity to
a coronary occlusion/ _Ic3. at 700/ the court held that medical
causation had been established:
[D]id the circumstantial evidence before the referee establish
the causal connection between the occurrence and the death/
or must claimants prove it by expert medical testimony?
The unrebutted evidence of the preceding events leads
to the conclusion that the over-exertion and possibly
the blow from the handcar were the cause of the coronary
occlusion. This conclusion is not negatived by any evidence
in the record/ and where as here a death occurs in the
course of employment/ within a short time/ following a
blow and overexertion as established by the evidence before
the referee/ a presumption arises that the injury arose
out of the employment. We hold that in such circumstances
the claimants were not obliged to establish a causal connectior
between the accident and resulting death by expert medical
testimony. Ijd. at 701.
As in the Havens case/ the facts relating to Mr. Steward's
activities and schedule are undisputed.

He was working under

conditions of stress and extreme fatigue/ and was stricken while
driving his company truck and while complying with the rigorous
schedule imposed on him by his employer.

Medical causation

has been established by Mrs. Steward in this proceeding even
if Dr. Heilbrun's opinion and the judicially noted material
were not considered/ since no other causes for his death have
been medically established.
The Fund claims the Commission erred in not referring
the matter to a medical panel.

As stated in Section 35-1-77/

Utah Code Annotated 1953/ as amended/ "the Commission may refer
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the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel. ..." (Emphasis
added)

Referral of matters to a medical panel is therefore

discretionary.

See Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission/

703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985).
Appellants assert that the present situation is one "where
the evidence of causal connection between the work-related event
and the injury is uncertain or highly technical"/ Champion Home
Builders/ supra/ at 308.

The undisputed evidence in this matter/

however/ establishes the causal connection between Mr. Stewardfs
stress and fatigue and his death.

Contrary to Appellants' assertions

the circumstances surrounding Mr. Steward's death were clearly
established and were tied by competent medical authority to
his death.
POINT IV.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MET ITS DUTY TO
REVIEW THE ENTIRE RECORD

The Workers' Compensation Fund asserts that the Industrial
Commission erred by not reviewing the entire record in the matter
as mandated by Section 35-1-82.54, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as amended/ since the hearing was not transcribed until after
the August 27/ 1987 Order Denying Motion for Review.

Even if

the Commission did not have access to the transcript/ which
has not been established by the Fund/ the Commission had the
benefit of the Administrative Law Judge's summary of testimony
(R. 248-250)/ which accurately summarized the evidence presented
at the hearing.

The Commission adequately considered the entire

record in this proceeding.
CONCLUSION
As found by the Administrative Law Judge and affirmed
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by the Industrial Commission, Applicant Bernice Steward met
her burden of establishing both legal and medical causation
with respect to the work-related death of her husband on November
12, 1985.

The trier of fact had before him no evidence establishing

that Mr. Steward had a preexisting heart condition.

In addition,

he made no finding that Mr. Stewardfs use of amphetamines constitute*
a preexisting condition.

There is no dispute that Mr. Steward

was functioning under unusually stressful circumstances and
was extremely fatigued.

No medical evidence was provided by

the Workers' Compensation Fund that considered the fatigue and
stress elements or related them to Mr. Steward's death. Mrs.
Steward, on the other hand, introduced the opinion of Dr. Heilbrun
that her husband's death was medically linked to his employment-cause
stress and fatigue.

There is no basis in this proceeding to

claim that the findings of the Administrative Law Judge, as
affirmed by the Industrial Commission, were arbitrary or capricious
or unsupported by any substantial evidence.

The matter did

not require submission to a medical panel and the ruling of
the Industrial Commission should be affirmed.
DATED this

/ *>

day of February, 1988.

DWIGHT L. KING & ASSOCIATES/ P.C.

-22-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Undersigned certifies that four (4) copies of the foregoing
Brief of Respondents was mailed/ postage prepaid/ this
day of February/ 1988 to the following:
James R. Black
Kevin M. McDonough
Black & Moore
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
261 East Broadway/ Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Barbara Elicerio
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City/ Utah 84145-0580
Attorney General's Office
236 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

-23-

/>

APPENDIX

-24-

35-1-77. Medical panel — Discretionary authority of commission to refer case — Findings and reports —
Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses.
Upon the filing of a ciaim for compensation for injury by accident, or for
death, arising out of or in the course of employment, and where the employer
or insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may refer the medical
aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the commission and having
the qualifications generally applicable to the medical panel set forth in section 35-2-56. The medical panel shall then make such study, take such X-rays
and perform such tests, including post-mortem examinations where authorized by the commission, as it may determine and thereafter make a report in
writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the commission, and also
make such additional findings as the commission may require. The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report of the panel to the
applicant, the employer and the insurance carrier by registered mail with
return receipt requested. Within fifteen days after such report is deposited in
the United States post office, the applicant, the employer or the insurance
carrier may file with the commission objections in writing thereto. If no objections are so filed within such period, the report shall be deemed admitted in
evidence and the commission may base its finding and decision on the report
of the panel, but shall not be bound by such report if there is other substantial
conflicting evidence in the case which supports a contrary finding by the
commission. If objections to such report are filed the commission may set the
case for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved, and at such hearing any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman of
the medical panel present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good cause shown the commission may order other members of the
panel, with or without the chairman, to be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. Upon such hearing the written report of the
panel may be received as an exhibit but shall not be considered as evidence in
the case except as far as it is sustained by the testimony admitted. The expenses of such study and report by the medical panel and of their appearance
before the commission shall be paid out of the fund provided for by section
35-1-68.
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION

35-1-82.55

35-1-82.54. Review of cases and orders by commission —
Procedure — Effect of award [Effective until
January 1, 1988].
The commission, upon referral of a case to it by an administrative law
judge, or upon a motion being filed with it to review its own order, or an
administrative law judge's supplemental order, shall review the entire record
made in said case, and, in its discretion, may hold further hearings and receive further evidence, and make findings of fact and enter its award thereon
The award of the commission shall be final unless set aside by the Supreme
Court as hereinafter provided

Review of cases and orders by commission — Procedure — Effect of award [Effective January 1,
1988].
(1) When a case is referred to the commission by an administrative law
judge, or when a motion is filed with the commission to review its own order
or an administrative law judge's supplemental order, the commission shall
review the entire record made in the case, may hold further hearings and
receive further evidence, and shall make findings of fact and enter its award
(2) The award of the commission is final unless set aside by the Court of
Appeals
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35-1-88- Boles of evidence and procedure before oonnnriisirm and heariag examiner—Admissible evidence.—Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall be bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules
„f evidence, or by any technical or formal rule* of procedure, other than
3s herein provided or as adopted by the commission pursuant to this act.
The commission may make its investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties
and to carry out justly the spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The commission may receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact
in dispute all evidence deemed material and relevant including, but not
limited to the following :
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented in open hearings.
(b) Reports of attending or examining physicians, or of pathologists.
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the commission.
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of time sheets, book ac. uiiuts or other records.
\t) Hospital records in the case of an injured or diseased employee.
History: X*. 1917, ch. 1009 f SS; C L»
1917. $5149; E. 8. 1933 4 C. 1*43, 40-142;
L. 196&, c*. 67, § 1.
Compiler's Hotes.
The 1965 amendment rewrote this section which read: "The commission shall
sot be bound by the usual common law
r statutory rules of evidence, or by any
:»rhnieal or formal rules of procedure,
VT'IT than as herein provided; but may
au«ke its investigations in such manner as
•n its judgment is best calculated to as-rtum the substantial rights of the par
"•••s and to carry out justly the bpint of
!hi^ title."
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JUDICIAL NOTICE.
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative
facts.
lb) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or <2> capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.
(d> When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a
party and supplied with the necessary information.
le) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the
tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request
may be made after judicial notice has been taken.
(fl Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceeding.
<gi Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal
case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and consolidates the
law of judicial notice formerly contained in
Rules 9 through 12, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971 • and in Utah Code Annotated. § 78-24-1
[76-25-1] 1953) (superseded by this rule] into
one broadly defined rule The Utah Supreme
Court has stated the rule with reference to judicial notice in Little Cottonwood Water Co. v.
Kimball. 76 Utah 243. 267. 289 Pac. 116 < 19301
where the court stated: "In short, a court is
presumed to know what every man of ordinary
intelligence must know about such things."
See also DeFusion Co. v. Utah Liquor Control
ComnVn. 613 P.2d 1120 lUtah 1980).
Subdivision (a) "governs only judicial notice
of adjudicative facts," and does not deal with
instances in which a court may notice legislative facts, which is left to the sound discretion
of trial and appellate courts Compare Rule 12.
Utah Rules of Evidence • 1971 > Since legislative facts are matters that go to the policy of a
rule of law as distinct from the true facts that
are used in the adjudication of a controversy
they are not appropriate for a rule of evidence
and best left to the law-making considerations
by appellate and trial courts.
Subdivision »b> is in accord with the Little
Cottonwood Water Co. case, supra, and the
substance of Rule 9<1> and <2). Utah Rules of
Evidence 1971 >. Utah law presumes that the
law o: another jurisdiction is the same as that
of the State of Utah and judicial notice has
been taken from the law of other states and
foreign countries. Lamberth v Lamberth. 550
P.2d 200 Utah 1976"; Maple v. Maple. 566
P.2d 1229 Utah 1977- The Utah court has
taken judicial notice under Rule 9<2). Utah
Rule.- of Evidence < 1971 • of the rules and regulation- of the Tax Commission. Nelson v. State
Tax Corr.rr.n. 29 Utah 2d 162. 506 P.2d 437
1
197/ Tht broad language of subdivision -b -is
idem.... ;. Rule 201 of the Uniform Rules ot
Ewden^ 1974 • Judicial notice of foreign law
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is permissible under this rule. Provisions of
this rule supersede Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-25-1 < 1953' [superseded by this rule],
since the statute is merely illustrative of items
encompassed within the broad framework of
this rule. The foreign law of some jurisdictions
might best be left to proof through witnesses if
the resort to sources available in the State of
Utah is questionable
Subdivision <c) is discretionary, but subdivision id) requires the court to take judicial notice if requested by a party and if supplied with
the necessary information to make a determination of whether to take judicial notice. Compare Rules 9<2> and 10«3 . Utah Rules of Evidence 11971». The committee believes that Rule
201 d) simplifies the process of taking judicial
notice of adjudicative facts by making it mandatory when a party makes a request therefor
and supplies the court with the necessary information.
Subdivision >e» is similar to Rule 10<1>. «2'»
and 3>. Utah Rules of Evidence '1971).
Subdivision <g is in accord with Rule 11,
Utah Rules of Evidence • 1971». The provision
that in a criminal case the court shall instruct
the jury that it may but is not required to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed
has no counterpart in Utah Rules of Evidence
(19711 Accord. State v. Lawrence. 120 Utah
323. 234 P.2d 600 '1951 > See also. Amendment
VI. Constitution of the United States.
Cross-References. — Court to impart matters of judicial knowledge to jury. § 78-21-3.
Jury bound to accept declaration of judicial
knowledge. * 78-21-3.
Municipalities, notice of existence and classification. * 10-2-306
Ordinance or private statute, notice of, Rule
9M.. UR.CP.
Seal of industrial commission, notice of.
$ 3V1-8
Se.il of public servu't- commission, notice of.
* 54-1-4.

iJOSFriiprpr.YM.r!,r.A.c.c.
CARDIOLOGY

COTTONWOOD MEDICAL TOWER
5770 SOUTH 250 EAST, SUITE 340
MURRAY, UTAH 84107

J u l y 29, 1986

Shaun Howel1
Attorney a t Law
S t a t e I n s u r a n c e Fund
560 South 300 East
P.O. Box 45420

RE: Dale W. Steward
#86-05663
Inj:

11-11-85

Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0420
Dear Counselor:
T have evaluated all of the information sent to me on this
somewhat complicated case.
It seems clear that Mr. Steward was not conscious when his
rig swerved to the left and ran off coming to rest on top of the median wall
without apparently overturning or coming to an abrupt stop as it would with
a collision. Additionally on arrival in the Emergency Department there was
no gross evidence of physical injury or trauma according to the emergency
physician. Additionally, the photographs sent to me demonstrate very little
trauma to the rig he was driving. Thus, I think trauma can be excluded
with a reasonable degree of confidence in this case.
Complicating the issue is the mention of narcolepsy in the
medical record. The patient had given a history of sudden sleep attacks
while driving and had been treated with amphetamines by his physician for
several years prior to his demise. I find no studies in the record to
document narcolepsy, thus this diagnosis is not secure in this individual.
Of the two scenarios which may have occurred, that is falling
asleep then suffering a cardiac arrest sometime after contacting tiie median
wall, or having the cardiac arrest while driving, only the latter seems to
have firm medical support. Had he suffered narcolepsy while driving he
would have awakened when he left the road (T speak from experience) and
there seemed to be no event which would have been of sufficient severity
to cause his death. It is remotely possible that the shock and fear ot
waking up in the middle of a serious accident would have been sufficient
to engender the fatal cardiac arrhythmia, but this does not seem very
probable.
In terms of medical probability it is most likely that he experienced a fatal, cardiac arrhythmia while driving, lost consciousness a few
seconds later thus losing control of the vehicle and having the accident as
reported. It is possibLe that his dextroamphetamine was related to his death
because it may worsen arrhythmias in susepfible individuals.

TEtEPHONE (801) 266 3418
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page 2 continued

An autopsy would have been supporting this diagnosis, but likely
would not have confirmed it with an absolute degree of certainty. I suspect it
would have shown amphetamines present and coronary artery disease present. At
this point in time exuming the body would not shed any light on the presence
of amphetamine. It would, however, document the presence or absence of coronary
artery disease. In the absence of drugs it is extremely unusual for cardiac
arrest to occur in a person with normal coronary arteries. If the absence
of coronary artery disease could be documented, then the scenario of striking
the median wall, waking up and then suffering a fatal arrhythmia would become
somewhat more plausible. Whether or not that has any legal significance is
of course not within my area of expertise.
In summary in terms of reasonable medical probability, the
patient suffered a fatal arrhythmia while driving and the accident was simply
the result of his Heath and subsequent loss of control of the vehicle. While
other possibilities pxist, they are far less likely. To exume and perform
a post-mortum examination of the body would alter those probabilities to an
extent, hut it is highly unlikely it would provide definitive answer.
T hone this has been helpful to you.
Sincerely

J. Joseph Pemry, M.D.
JJP/jv
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THE

^

UNIVERSITY
OFUTAH

M. Peter H e i l b r u n . M.D.
Ronald I. Apfelbaum, M.D.
LaVerne S. Erickson, M.D.
Marion L. W a l k e r , M.D.

July 25, 1986

Mrs. Bernice Steward
1410 West Sixth South
Salt Lake City, UT 84104
Dear Mrs. Steward:
I am enclosing the following letter. Please read through it and advise me
if you feel it satisfactorily explains my thoughts on the industrially
related nature of Dale's heart attack.
Regards,

4 ^

£sd^ MA

M. Peter Heilbrun, M.D.
MPH/tw
Enclosure

(Tr:7/31/86)

Dictated by the doctor;
signed in his absence.

EXHIBIT NO.

Division of Neurological Surger\
>Lhn.,| f Meduine
r
'\i Mt'dnnl Drive
}
N u t 1 • r Clt\ I't.lh M l 2
Ml) SM-b'MlS
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T

M. Peter Heilbrun. M.D.
Ronald 1. Apfelbaum. M.D.
LaVerne S. Erickson. M.D.
Marion L. W a l k e r . M.D.

THE

^

UNIVERSITY
OF UTAH

July 25, 1986

To Whom It May Concern:
Re:

Dale Steward

Mr. Dale Steward was treated by me over several years, from the time of his
industrial injury of August 1, 1975, to his death in 1985.
I last saw Mr. Steward on July 29, 1985, at which time he was having
further neck pain which suggested evidence of persistent degenerative
osteoarthritis without evidence of significant root compression. In
addition, he had evidence of left shoulder pain secondary to either
bicipital tendonitis impingement syndrome of the humeral head or a small
rotator cuff tear. He improved with local injection by Dr. Ronald Mann.
It should be noted that, although Mr. Steward had evidence of musculoskeletal disease, his apparent cause of death was a myocardial infarction
while driving a truck.
He had no prior history of cardiac disease, thus his death should be considered to be an industrial-related cardiac event.
Regards,

M. Peter Heilbrun, M.D.
Professor and Head
Division of Neurosurgery
MPH/tw

Dictated by the doctor;
signed in his absence.

(Tr:7/31/86)

'H:3IT NO.

D m s i o n of N e u r o l o g i c a l Surger>
>< hoo! of \lcdk no
M) \«>rh \!<>di<a! f)r \<Mlt i ak- Cil\ I Mb M l L>
( S H I I ">>l-t)(lt>S
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THE

^

UNIVERSITY
OF UTAH

M. Peter Heilbrun, VI.D.
Ronald I. \ p f e l b a u m . M.I)
LaVerne S. Erickson. M.I)
Marion L. Walker. M.D.

November 28, 1986

Mr. Thomas R. King
Suite 205, Sentinel Building
2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Dear Mr. King:
Thank you for your letter dated October 30, regarding the description of
events leading to possible fatigue and stress surrounding Mr. Steward's
untimely death on November 12 or 13, 1985.
In addition to your letter, I reviewed the letter of Dr. J. Joseph Perry.
I agree with Dr. Perry that there was medical probability that Mr. Steward
suffered a fatal arrhythmia while driving, resulting in his loss of control
of the vehicle and the subsequent accident.
The issue of narcolepsy as a contributing factor is a possibility. I
believe a review of the records of Dr. Gerald Moress would show that, in
fact, he had been diagnosed as having narcolepsy and was actively being
treated with amphetamine medications.
I would also state that I knew Mr. Steward as a patient for many years
dating back to his industrial injury of August 1, 1975, and although he had
multiple medical problems, he always managed to return to the work place
and perform extremely well.
As I stated in my note of July 25, 1986, addressed "To Whom It May
Concern", I believe that, with the stress surrounding the driving and
delivery requirements of Mr. Steward's job, I agree with Dr. Perry that
there is reasonable medical probability that the patient suffered a fatal
arrhythmia while driving and, thus, his death should be considered an
industrial related cardiac event. I do not feel there would be any benefit
in performing a postmortem examination of his body. His death occurred
while he was working and performing the required conditions of his employment. Because the medical examiner in Colorado did not perform an autopsy
at the time of death, it should not be a factor in the denial of benefits
to his widow by the Utah State Industrial Commission.

Dnision of Nt'iir nlo^H .it *Minf<T\\
N ll.i,

' V. ,
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Thomas R. King
November 28, 1986
Page Two

I hope this information is helpful.
Regards,

M. Peter Heilbrun, M.D.
MPH/dr
(Tr:12/8/86)
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